


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

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51

23 August 1968
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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EDT, 22 August 1968)

Europe

	<u>Page</u>
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	1
USSR RESORTS TO INVASION IN CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS	3
The military move by Soviet and East European forces caught the Czechoslovak leadership off guard, but, despite the smoothness of the operation, it is evident that the Soviets were not prepared with a puppet government to take over and that the decision to move had been made at a fairly late date.	
YUGOSLAV STUDENTS AND PARTY ON COLLISION COURSE	6
Yugoslav students left school in June in a triumphant mood, after Tito's conciliatory address on television, but they will return next month disillusioned by the events of the summer.	

Far East

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	7
VIETNAM	9
Communist forces throughout South Vietnam continue to complete preparations for large-scale offensive operations in areas of major strategic importance. They are also increasing pressure on secondary targets and objectives in several parts of the country.	

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

TURMOIL PERSISTS IN PEKING'S MISSILE MINISTRY 12
Organizations responsible for important aspects of advanced weapons development continued to be embroiled in factional disputes, at least through July.

OKINAWAN CONSERVATIVES FACE STIFF TEST FROM LEFTISTS 13
The conservative Liberal Democratic Party in Okinawa will apparently face a stiff contest from the leftist opposition in the elections this November for chief executive and the legislature.

CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION LOSING STEAM 15
The trend away from militancy is becoming more evident in Communist China.

Middle East - Africa

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 17


SOVIET MILITARY AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST 18
The USSR appears to be working out arrangements to supply additional military equipment over the next year or so to its Middle Eastern clients. Meanwhile, deliveries under earlier agreements continue.

SYRIA IMPOSES TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS 19
The Syrians, concerned over their own inability to control unrest both inside and outside the country, have lashed out at other Arab states which they believe to be abetting plots against the Damascus regime.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET



25X1

TURKISH SERVICE CHIEFS REPLACED

21

The replacement of the army, navy, and air force commanders consolidates power in the hands of the chief of the Turkish General Staff, a political conservative who has generally cooperated with the Demirel government.

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES

22

A coalition of army elements and leftist-extremists presently appears dominant, but the month-old political turmoil is not over and moderate forces may yet recoup their strength.

Western Hemisphere

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

23



24

25X6

PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT PUSHES ELECTORAL COUNTERFRAUD

25

Efforts by president-elect Arias to dictate the winners of National Assembly seats are creating friction with National Guard Commandant Vallarino.

SECRET

SECRET

ATTEMPTED COUP FAILS IN BOLIVIA

26

Dissident members of the military and political activists failed in their attempt to overthrow President Barrientos, but even if he rides out this challenge he may face more dangerous problems.

HAITI EXPLOITING TRIALS FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES

27

President Duvalier is exploiting the trials of persons allegedly involved in the invasion on 20 May for propaganda attacks against "enemies" abroad, including the US.

SECRET

SECRET

EUROPE

The Russian-led occupation of Czechoslovakia was militarily a smooth operation. What remains wholly unclear is what the Russians are going to do about establishing a workable political arrangement for ruling Czechoslovakia. (See immediately following article)

The reactions of European Communist states and parties to the occupation were as expected. The Eastern European participants in the military move echoed the Soviet rationale for intervention.

In Rumania, a joint session of party and government officials and representatives of mass organizations issued a communique on 21 August which expressed full solidarity with the Czechoslovak people and the Czechoslovak party. Later, party and state chief Nicolae Ceausescu appealed to the populace to be calm and firm but vigilant, and ready "at any moment to defend our socialist fatherland, Rumania."

In Yugoslavia, Tito spoke more softly than Ceausescu, probably because of concern that unrest might be sparked in Yugoslavia by the Russian action. Tito merely expressed "concern" over the violation of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty.

The Italian and French Communist parties also lost no time in denouncing the invasion. [REDACTED]

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Military Intervention in Czechoslovakia



Movements of Soviet and East European Forces

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USSR RESORTS TO INVASION IN CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS

Soviet and East European forces began moving into Czechoslovakia late on 20 August and by early morning on the next day had occupied Prague and other major cities. The movement of forces was implemented suddenly and apparently caught the Czechoslovak leadership off guard.

A large portion of the 20-odd Soviet divisions ringing Czechoslovakia apparently have moved into the country along with East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian units.

There are no indications that any Czechoslovak military units resisted the intervention.

Despite the smoothness of the military operation, the Soviet political actions which preceded it suggest that the decision to intervene militarily came at a fairly late date. Among these were the reported convening of the Central Committee when the top leaders were on vacation, the flimsiness of the legal base for Soviet action, and the failure to surface quickly an alternative leadership in Prague. It would appear that Soviet intervention did not flow naturally from the Cierna meeting but represented instead a scrapping of the position agreed to there.

The most likely explanation of this reversal appears to be that under the impact of internal pressures within the leadership and importuning from its anxious allies in Eastern Europe, the fragile balance in the politburo was upset in favor of those who may all along have wanted the toughest kind of policy and who have made use of the time and developments since Cierna to undo the agreement.

Soviet troops quickly rounded up the leading liberals in the Czech administration, including party chief Dubcek, Prime Minister Cernik, National Assembly chairman Smrkovsky, and Party Secretary Cisar. At the same time the occupation forces permitted leading Czechoslovak political bodies to meet and issue proclamations and allowed the press and radio to operate through most of the 21st.

By evening, however, many of the regular radio and television stations had ceased transmitting and Soviet troops had occupied the news agency headquarters. Numerous loyalist transmitters, nevertheless, continued to broadcast in support of the Dubcek regime. As the Soviets arrived in other localities, many unit commanders agreed with local authorities to limit their presence

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in the cities and towns in exchange for assurances that the local populations would be restrained from provocative activities.

Czech party and government authorities ordered that there be no military resistance to the intervening forces and, later, urged the Czech people to avoid active resistance. Sporadic resistance, however, was offered in a few localities; a total of six killed and about 200 wounded was reported during the first 24 hours. The people also manifested their support for Dubcek in a series of parades, demonstrations and wildcat strikes. The Czechoslovak military refused to cooperate with the occupying forces, and Defense Minister Dzur, who was later arrested, instructed the army to obey only those orders issued by President Svoboda. A progovernment radio station suggested to signal units of the army and amateur radio operators that they jam the signals of the occupying forces. The National Assembly held out the prospect of a general strike as a last resort to counter the intervention.

The Soviets apparently did not have a puppet government ready to take power, but by 22 August it was evident that they were working with a group of the more conservative members of the regime in an effort to establish a more malleable government. On the 22nd, Pravda for the first

time condemned Dubcek by name, accusing him of leading a minority faction which supported counter-revolution and had treacherously betrayed Communist ideals. A Moscow radiobroadcast cited approvingly an anonymous address by certain regime members who claimed that the intervention had safeguarded Czechoslovakia's past, present and future.

Czechoslovak radio stations loyal to Dubcek claimed that a group of central committee members--including presidium members Bilak, Barbirek Svestka and Kolder, and secretariat member Indra--had met with the Soviets on 21 August and planned other meetings. These men are likely candidates to form the nucleus of a new regime.

Radio Prague reported that according to "military circles" of the Soviet Army, Moscow apparently hoped to impose a new government on Czechoslovakia on 22 August. The radio added that a list of those legally-elected Czechoslovak representatives to be arrested has been prepared. An earlier broadcast had stated that members of the Czechoslovak security forces, in cooperation with Soviet military police, are "taking action" against the lawful Czechoslovak representatives. This does not, however, appear to be true in all cases.

Czechoslovak party loyalists apparently still hoped on 22 August

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to stage the 14th Party Congress--originally scheduled for 9 September--in a last ditch effort to demonstrate that they would not accept a government and party leadership imposed from Moscow. A loyal radio station has appealed to delegates to the Congress to go to factories in the Prague area to prepare for an immediate meeting. The radio told them not to go the Hotel Praha or to district party headquarters, warning that the former was a trap and the latter would no longer help them. The radio also denounced as "traitors" the five high party officials who have urged cooperation with the Soviets.

The reactions of European Communist states and parties to these events have been as expected. The Eastern European participants in the military move echoed the Soviet rationale for intervention.

In Rumania, a joint session of party and government officials and representatives of mass organizations issued a communiqué on 21 August which expressed full

solidarity with the Czechoslovak people and the Czechoslovak Communist party. The communiqué bluntly stated that "nothing can justify" armed intervention against Czechoslovakia which it described as a "flagrant violation of national sovereignty."

Following the joint session, Rumanian party and state chief Nicolae Ceausescu made a highly nationalistic speech and condemned the action of the Warsaw Pact five. Ceausescu appealed to the populace to be calm and firm but vigilant, and ready "at any moment to defend our socialist fatherland, Rumania." Ceausescu announced the establishment of Worker-Peasant Guard units.

In Yugoslavia, Tito spoke more softly than Ceausescu, probably because of concern that unrest might be sparked in Yugoslavia by the Russian action. Tito merely expressed "concern" over the violation of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty. The details of the Yugoslav position probably will be developed at a party plenum scheduled for 23 August.

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YUGOSLAV STUDENTS AND PARTY ON COLLISION COURSE

Yugoslav students left school in June in a triumphant mood, after Tito's conciliatory address on television, but they will return next month disillusioned by the events of the summer. Protests and disorders may recur, unless the regime presents a university reform program which meets the demands the students set forth last June.

During the summer the regime became increasingly critical of the student movement and backed away from the idea of university autonomy and a greater voice for the students in university affairs which it had accepted in June.

During July virtually every major party organization in Serbia launched attacks on certain individuals and party organizations at Belgrade University. A session of the Belgrade city party conference developed into a major indictment of "liberal elements" at the university, and Belgrade's party chief made it clear that the necessary steps would be taken to eliminate these elements. The session dissolved the party organizations within the departments of philosophy and sociology for their antiregime behavior during the student riots.

In Croatia, the faculties of philosophy and political science at Zagreb University have been

the subject of a succession of stormy party meetings with re-criminations and threats of disciplinary action against professors and students. Dissident professors within these faculties still have significant influence within the university's basic party organization, however, and Croatian party officials have not been able to regain complete control over them. The crusade to expel them is likely to become even more intense.

Several liberal publications also appear to be in jeopardy. A defamatory campaign against Praxis, the controversial philosophical journal published in Zagreb, and the probable withdrawal of its financial subsidy are expected to force its closure. Selected issues of Belgrade and Zagreb universities' student reviews have been banned and continued pressure to close down the publications or shake up their editorial staffs will heighten student-party tensions.

Shortly after classes begin in September an extraordinary conference of Belgrade University's Student Federation will discuss the party guidelines published last June as well as future student activities. These activities may lead to disorder, especially if the regime incorporates additional hard-line measures into the university reform.

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FAR EAST

Increased enemy military activity in South Vietnam this week may be the preliminary to large-scale offensive operations in areas of major strategic significance.

The widely scattered rocket and mortar attacks and ground probes have had relatively little impact thus far on allied positions, but the Communists have not yet committed a significant portion of the attack forces they have been readying for action over the past several weeks.

Communist propagandists so far have treated the new round of attacks in a relatively low key and have not publicized them as the "third phase" of the general offensive.

In Saigon, Vice President Ky continues to make a public show of unity with President Thieu, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ky gives every indication, however, of being content to bide his time, waiting until Thieu either feels compelled to give him a larger role in the government or makes a major blunder which would give the vice president an opening to move against him.

Indications continue to mount that a major new turning point in the Chinese Cultural Revolution may have been reached. Peking has officially declared that the Red Guards are no longer the "vanguard" of the Cultural Revolution. It has delegated new authority to the army to impose order on warring factions, and is pushing ahead with the formation of provincial governments dominated by the military after several months of indecision.

Laotian Government forces last week recaptured Muong Phalane, an important post in southern Laos lost to Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in June. Close air support apparently inflicted heavy casualties on the Communists, who left behind large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment. [REDACTED]

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VIETNAM

Communist forces throughout South Vietnam continue to complete preparations for large-scale offensive operations in areas of major strategic importance. They are also increasing pressure on secondary targets in several parts of the country.

The Communists staged several well-coordinated attacks in II, III, and IV Corps this week. The capital of Tay Ninh Province bore the brunt of the attacks, which included extensive mortar bombardment and ground assaults in many instances.

The first enemy attacks occurred northwest of Saigon early on 18 August in Tay Ninh Province and adjacent Binh Long Province against Special Forces camps, allied artillery bases, base camps, and remote South Vietnamese outposts. In the western highlands, the Dak Seang Special Forces camp was hit by a heavy mortar barrage and an unsuccessful ground assault. Several other allied positions in Kontum Province were also struck during this initial wave of attacks.

On 19 and 20 August, Communist forces maintained pressure in Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces by shelling remote positions. Enemy rocket shellings of Saigon resumed on 22 August after a two-month hiatus. Other military bases in III Corps, including the Bien Hoa Airfield, were also struck by enemy fire later in the week.

By mid-week, the focus of enemy offensive activity spread

to the delta provinces. The recent attacks there were mounted mainly by local force and guerrilla units while Viet Cong main force units there reportedly were maneuvering into attack positions near strategic targets. Most of the attacks were of a hit-and-run nature. Unlike the Tet offensive, the Viet Cong in the recent attacks have in some cases withdrawn from target areas without much of an attempt to hold their positions. One tactical objective of the delta attacks may have been to keep allied troops pinned down in the static defense of cities and towns, rather than allow them to pursue Viet Cong forces and upset enemy logistical systems.

The current posture of Communist forces in the northern provinces is such that large-scale offensives there could begin anytime. Communist main force units have moved into areas near vital targets along the coast and have completed battle preparations just south of the Demilitarized Zone.

Communist propaganda treatment of this week's military action generally has been low key. There has been no effort to publicize the attacks as the "third phase" of the general offensive. The Viet Cong's Liberation Radio on 20 August said that the Tay Ninh action "repudiated" US contentions that there is "a lull in the fighting" and that Communist forces are not in a position to carry out large-scale attacks.

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Political Developments
in the South

The Communists this week announced a full-fledged formal program for their National Alliance. The program is little different from the shorter and more general platform announced last April when the Alliance was first formed. As outlined in the new program, the goals of the Alliance differ little from those of the Liberation Front, but the Alliance advertises itself, rather than the Front, as the proper authority to negotiate an end to the war with the US and to arrange a postwar political settlement. This general downplaying of the importance of the Front further confuses the issue of which organization the Communists intend to use to speak for them at the peace table or represent them in a postwar government. It reveals little of Communist intentions and appears mainly to be another effort to publicize and enhance the status of the Alliance.

The militant Buddhists concluded a three-day Congress on 20 August, according to press reports by demanding that the government rescind recognition of the charter of the rival moderate faction, which has in effect made it the official Buddhist church of South Vietnam. In addition, the militants reportedly called for the return of the moderates' National Shrine to their control, the release of Buddhists still in custody since the 1966 "struggle movement," and compensation by the government for

damage caused to pagodas during the fighting this year.

The militants suffered a series of setbacks beginning in the spring of 1966. The government then put down their struggle movement, recognized the moderates' charter in July 1967, and imprisoned Thich Tri Quang for four months after the Tet offensive began. Since 1966 pressure grew among the militants for a retreat from the faction's usual extremism. Several leaders of the faction even hoped to have the militants abandon all political activity and concentrate on ecclesiastical matters. Tri Quang's release and return to a leadership position, however, may have persuaded militants to use extreme methods to wrest control from the church moderates.

Meanwhile, the private enmity between Vice President Ky and President Thieu apparently will continue to be papered over by acts of public unity.



Ky said he recognizes the importance of maintaining national unity, although he feels that Thieu is seeking his neutralization not his cooperation. The vice president said, however, he would be on his guard not to associate himself with some of the very unpopular moves which he believed Thieu is almost sure to make.



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TURMOIL PERSISTS IN PEKING'S MISSILE MINISTRY

The factional struggles of the Cultural Revolution have again brought Chou En-lai's personal intervention in an attempt to restore order in the 7th Ministry of Machine Building, responsible for China's strategic missile program.

According to a recent Red Guard magazine, Chou received a report on 1 June on the ministries of machine building which carry out military production. Hearing that production was at a "complete standstill" in the 7th Ministry, Chou conveyed his displeasure to one of the factional groups there.


Chou had received a delegation from this faction in January, along with representatives of other defense organizations, and had accused groups in the 7th Ministry of fighting for a year and a half and damaging equipment and finished products. He re-emphasized the theme that "taking firm hold of revolution and stimulating production" was vital for defense industries and research organizations.

Chou's June remarks indicate that his January exhortations had little effect. Since his expression of displeasure in June, Peking has taken some steps to reverse the militant course of the Cultural Revolution. Whether these moves have any effect on the rivalry in the 7th Ministry is not yet apparent, but, through

at least mid-July, posters attacking Minister Wang Ping-chang and his boss--chairman of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission Nieh Jung-Chen--were still prominent in Peking. Both have survived previous attacks, however, and still appear at military conferences.

Political infighting in the ministry began in the fall of 1966 and by early 1967 management and production were severely disrupted. Many key administrators have been temporarily removed or continually harassed. Even if open competition is curbed, the effects of the two-year struggle for political control of the ministry will probably persist.

The impact of two years' disruption on China's missile programs is difficult to measure. These programs are still in a developmental stage.



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Some of the apparent slowdown in the missile field probably results from technical problems or decisions unrelated to the political struggle, but the Cultural Revolution is at least partly responsible.

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OKINAWAN CONSERVATIVES FACE STIFF TEST FROM LEFTISTS

The conservative Liberal Democratic Party in Okinawa will apparently face a stiff contest from the leftist opposition in the elections this November for chief executive and the legislature.

Last week, the opposition coalition set back the conservatives by upsetting the Liberal Democratic candidate in a mayoralty race in northern Okinawa. In this first direct confrontation between the entrenched conservatives and the coalition's newly formed political machine, the opposition demonstrated its ability to make inroads into the conservatives' rural strongholds. The leftist victory, however, may have a salutary effect on the conservatives and inspire more determined campaigning for the coming elections.

Even prior to last week's mayoralty contest the Liberal Democrats' electoral position had been weakened. The presence of US

B-52s in Okinawa since February and the alleged radioactive contamination of Naha harbor by US nuclear submarines have hurt the Liberal Democrats, who are identified with the US administration in Okinawa. Scandals involving government officials have also become political liabilities. The left apparently exploited these issues successfully in the recent mayoralty election.

The leftist coalition, however, has problems of its own. There are signs of rifts within the tripartite coalition, which is made up of disparate elements ranging from moderate Socialists to Communists. One indication of the infighting within the coalition has been the reported wrangling among the parties over the nomination of common candidates in certain electoral districts. Liberal Democratic candidates, however, still appear to have only an even chance of winning the race for chief executive and of maintaining their slim majority in the legislature.


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Status of Provincial Level Governments

- ☐ Revolutionary Committee
☐ Preparatory Group for Revolutionary Committee
☐ Military Control Committee



Revolutionary Committee*	Date Formed	Chairmanship	Revolutionary Committee*	Date Formed	Chairmanship
	1967			1968	
Heilungkiang	31 Jan.	Civilian	Kiangsi	5 Jan.	Military
Shanghai	5 Feb.	Civilian	Kansu	24 Jan.	Military
Kweichow	14 Feb.	Military	Honan	27 Jan.	Civilian
Shantung	23 Feb.	Civilian	Hopeh	3 Feb.	Civilian
Shansi	18 Mar.	Civilian	Hupei	5 Feb.	Military
Peking	20 Apr.	Civilian	Kwangtung	21 Feb.	Military
Tsinghai	12 Aug.	Military	Kirin	6 Mar.	Military
Inner Mongolia	1 Nov.	Military	Kiangsu	23 Mar.	Military
Tientsin	6 Dec.	Civilian	Chekiang	24 Mar.	Military
			Hunan	9 Apr.	Military
			Ningsia	10 Apr.	Military
			Anhui	18 Apr.	Military
			Shensi	1 May	Civilian
			Liaoning	10 May	Military
			Szechwan	31 May	Military
			Yunnan	13 Aug.	Military
			Fukien	19 Aug.	Military

*A Maoist form of local government created during the Cultural Revolution to replace discredited party and government units.

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CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION LOSING STEAM

The trend away from militancy is becoming more evident in Communist China. Peking has officially declared that the era of Red Guard politics is over, has delegated new authority to the army to impose order on fighting factionalists, and has renewed the formation of provincial governments dominated by the military after several months of indecision. The establishment of "revolutionary committees" in Yunnan on 13 August and Fukien on 19 August leaves only three areas without formal governments: Kwangsi, Sinkiang and Tibet.

On 15 and 18 August editorials in Peking's major newspapers revealed Mao Tse-tung's "latest instruction" declaring that the "vanguard" role played by Red Guards is ended and that they must now subordinate themselves to the working class. The editorials criticized university students, saying that some "look down upon workers and peasants" and must be disciplined for this. Such statements will further strengthen the hand of the army-supported "worker-peasant teams" which have been trying for several weeks to impose discipline on students in China's large universities.

In the provinces, Peking's efforts to form "revolutionary" governments are again gathering momentum. Long-awaited "revolutionary committees" were formed in rapid succession for troubled Yunnan and Fukien on 13 and 19

August. These were the first such announcements since the formation of the Szechwan government on 31 May. Peking media have underscored the need to complete this process "as soon as possible" in remaining areas.

Following the pattern of other provincial governing bodies formed earlier this year, Yunnan and Fukien are dominated by senior military officers, some of whom have been openly opposed by radical Maoist forces in Peking. The Yunnan chairman, Tan Fu-jen, concurrently named political commissar of the Kunming Military Region, had been in semiretirement in Peking as chief of the army supreme court.

The new Fukien governor, Han Hsien-chu, who is also the military region commander, has been bitterly opposed by radical forces. In both provinces, the top deputies are military region officers or old-line party or security officials. Representatives of "revolutionary mass" organizations, theoretically a major component of Maoist government, are conspicuously absent from top positions.

Developments in Yunnan and Fukien may indicate that solutions are being reached in Kwangsi, Tibet, and Sinkiang. In Sinkiang, at least, the recent reassignment of the commander of the Hunan Military District to a leading position in the province is the first sign that the impasse regarding Sinkiang's

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long-time party and military chief, Wang En-mao, has been broken. Peking's action in apparently demoting the controversial Wang could mark a face-saving compromise in the interest of reaching a quick decision on Sinkiang. It would not necessarily mean a victory for Wang's radical opponents, however, since his replacement has an equally strong record in Hunan Province of supporting "conservative" forces.

Previous turning points in the Cultural Revolution were

marked by purges of high-level officials. There is no indication that political casualties have occurred this time although a report that the army has increased patrolling of Peking's streets may be a sign of increased tension within the leadership. The last time the army was this active in the capital was in the period preceding the purge of the acting chief of staff and the Peking garrison commander last March.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

UN emissary Jarring is conducting another series of meetings in Arab capitals, but a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute seems as far away as ever.

The Jordanians are particularly discouraged over what they believe is a hardening of the Israeli position, and King Husayn is more unhappy than ever over his continuing inability to deal with the terrorist problem.

The Greek junta, although somewhat shaken by the recent assassination attempt, plans to go ahead with the scheduled constitutional referendum on 29 September. Meanwhile, arrests of antiregime persons are continuing, and special efforts have been made to detain all supporters of Andreas Papan-dreou who the junta claims is responsible for much of the recent violence.

In the Nigerian civil war, elements of federal forces deployed along the extended southern front are pushing into the Ibo heartland of secessionist Biafra. The drive, which the Biafrans are desperately trying to stem, appears to be the initial phase of an all-out "final" offensive. It further prejudices Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie's continuing efforts to arrange some agreement between the two sides, at least on an effective program of relief for the war's civilian victims.

The summit meeting in Algiers next month of the Organization for African Unity is shaping up to be the most potentially divisive of OAU meetings in recent years. Among the troublesome issues likely to come up are the unresolved Nigerian situation, election of a new secretary general to replace the adventurous incumbent, and Arab pressures for black African support against Israel.

In India, conflicts within Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's cabinet are deepening. Deputy Prime Minister Desai and Home Minister Chavan— both potential contenders for the prime ministership and the most powerful figures in the government—may be preparing for an eventual showdown with Mrs. Gandhi. Desai, however, is currently under heavy leftist attack in Parliament

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SOVIET MILITARY AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The USSR appears to be working out arrangements to supply additional military equipment over the next year or so to its Middle Eastern clients. A new Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement may already have been concluded; a Syrian military delegation has recently returned from Moscow, and the USSR has indicated it is willing to receive an Iraqi delegation. Meanwhile, deliveries under earlier agreements continue.

The Soviets probably agreed in principle on a new arms pact with Egypt when President Nasir and Chief of Staff Riyadh went to Moscow in July. A Soviet military delegation which accompanied Riyadh on his return to Cairo probably worked out the details of the agreement.

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They are believed to have requested support equipment as well as additional aircraft and land armaments. Moscow probably will provide additional weapons

but only at a rate it believes the Egyptians can absorb them.

A military delegation headed by Syria's chief of staff returned from a two-week visit to Moscow on 5 August. The Syrians probably discussed their military requirements for the next year or two. An Iraqi military delegation was to have departed for Moscow in late July, but as a result of the recent coup the visit appears to have been postponed.

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SYRIA IMPOSES TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS

The Baathist military regime in Damascus, fearful of new coup attempts, has entered into disputes with its Arab neighbors in the form of economic warfare.

Damascus recently imposed harsh trade and travel restrictions on Lebanon in an effort to force the Lebanese Government to curtail the subversive activities of Syrian exiles. Beirut has not responded to the Syrians' demands, and instead has countered by imposing its own, more limited restrictions against trade with Syria. The Lebanese, however, hope to be able to solve the problem without resorting to measures which might incite Syria to greater countermeasures.



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The Syrians are obviously becoming frantic over the activities of exiled Syrian politicians in Beirut and in Baghdad. Several leading members of the "moderate" Baathist regime ousted in February 1966 have gone to Baghdad to confer with the new Baathist government there, and press reports of mass defections in the Syrian officer corps are indicative of the basic unrest in the country.

The present lashing out at all real or imaginary enemies probably reflects the narrowly based Syrian regime's concern about its own fragility. No opposition group presently seems capable of overthrowing the government, but personal and factional rivalries have long presented the opportunity for some new combination of forces to undermine the regime and take over the government.

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
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TURKISH SERVICE CHIEFS REPLACED

The replacement of the commanders of the Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Force, announced for 30 August, is not likely to provoke any open reaction from their supporters nor does it herald any shift in the generally pro-West, pro-NATO line followed by the Turkish military establishment.

The departure of two of the departing chiefs, General Tansel of the air force and Admiral Uran of the navy, had been rumored for some time.



Their replacements, a trio of professionally competent and apparently apolitical officers clearly acceptable to Tural, may usher in an era of more harmonious working relationships between the Turkish General Staff and the services.

Tural's strength, already great, is likely to be enhanced

by the shift, and he may move even more aggressively against those officers in all services whom he suspects of opposing his own political views. The degree of his success in any extreme antileftist campaign would almost certainly benefit the present rightist government of Prime Minister Demirel, which has always been nervous about alleged leftist opposition in the officer corps.

Tural's "removal" of the retiring service chiefs is sure to be resented by some of their followers, especially in the air force. Nevertheless, he now has the power, as well as the temperament, to ride roughshod over their objections. Assuming that he can count on the cooperation of the new service chiefs, and helped by the network of informants he has had time to develop, Tural should be able to identify and neutralize any serious opposition to him that develops in the military.



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
CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES

A coalition of army elements and civilian leftist-extremists headed by the currently dominant military figure acquired a commanding position during the past week. There are indications, however, that the month-old power struggle involving personal, tribal, and ideological rivalries is not yet over.

The recently installed army commander, Captain Ngouabi, a northerner who presently has emerged as the Congo's new strong man, has placed his extremist allies in most of the key positions on the directorate of the newly formed National Council of the Revolution (CNR). Ngouabi has announced that the directorate, which he heads, is to exercise all political and governmental power until the country's institutions can be overhauled and new elections held. A "fundamental act" approved by the CNR to replace the scrapped constitution gives the directorate a veto power over any action of the president, the power to appoint a premier, and complete control over the cabinet. The latter is now composed mainly of technicians and supporters of President Massamba-Debat, a relative moder-

ate who had reduced the extremists' influence in recent months.

Although Massamba-Debat presently appears eclipsed by Ngouabi and the extremists, he has survived numerous intrigues during his five years as president, largely because of his ability to play regional and tribal groups against each other. He is said to be assessing his strength within the divided armed forces and may yet be able to recoup his position. The president is believed to have the support of moderate army elements as well as important southern tribal groups.



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He continues to assert that he has widespread public support and refuses to bless any deviation from his newly proclaimed devotion to an "African approach to socialism." Massamba-Debat has also continued to call publicly for a moderation of the Congo's foreign policies.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Preparations for the visit of Pope Paul VI to Colombia from 22 to 24 August dominated events in the hemisphere this week.

It is the first time in history that a Pope has visited Latin America, and the Colombians are going all out to make it a memorable occasion. The Pope is not expected to make any momentous pronouncements during his stay.




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In the Dominican Republic, relations between President Balaguer and Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party have eased following a meeting between the President and moderate leaders of the country's major opposition party. The President's pledge to allow the party's radiobroadcasts to resume has contributed to the lessening of frictions.

Jamaica appears to be less prepared to reach an early decision on joining the Organization of American States than appeared to be the case some weeks ago. A final decision will probably be delayed at least until Prime Minister Shearer sounds out the Canadian position on OAS membership during his visit to Ottawa next month.


In Argentina, General Alsogaray is still the commander in chief of the army despite widespread rumors that he was retiring.

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Reaction to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, both official and public, was prompt and unanimous in its condemnation of the Soviet Union for its actions. In Venezuela, the President's press secretary expressed his personal opinion that the Soviet action represents an "invitation to the US to move against Cuba." Other Venezuelans, including the minister of interior, have also linked the Czech crisis to the Cuban problem. Fidel Castro may actually be fearful that the US might be considering such a course.



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PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT PUSHES ELECTORAL COUNTERFRAUD

With little over a month remaining before his inauguration on 1 October, president-elect Arias is trying to dictate the winners of National Assembly seats and thus assure his National Union (NU) coalition at least a two thirds majority in the unicameral legislature. Arias is using his majority on the Electoral Tribunal to annul the elections of government deputies and replace them with his own followers prior to completion of the final ballot count.

These machinations, which have delayed settlement of the assembly elections for more than three months, are encountering sharp opposition from National Guard Commandant Vallarino. The guard chief presumably wants to retain some support in the legislature as leverage against any arbitrary actions by the new president once he is in office.

Arias' growing impatience with what he considers Vallarino's interference in the electoral process, however, may worsen relations with the National Guard. Arias has already told US officials that Vallarino has to go and that the general's pro forma resignation will be accepted when it is submitted on 1 October. 25X1 25X1

Vallarino, who appears to have the loyalty of his officers, does not seem inclined to step aside quite so easily, however. Although the two men appear to be on a collision course, at present they are motivated primarily by self-interest and an accommodation of some sort cannot be ruled out. If Arias proceeds recklessly, however, an open rupture with the guard may be unavoidable.

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ATTEMPTED COUP FAILS IN BOLIVIA

An attempt by dissident members of the military and opposition political activists to overthrow the Barrientos government has failed. If President Barrientos rides out this challenge, however, he is likely to be faced with problems that could prove to be even more dangerous.

The President announced on 21 August that several persons had been arrested in connection with a coup attempt early that morning. He said that the attempt had been led by the recently dismissed army chief of staff, whom he described as "ex-General" Marcos Vasquez Sempertegui, and that members of the opposition political parties had been involved. Although General Vasquez is not among those who have been arrested, he has little chance of success now that he has lost momentum and the element of surprise. 25X1

Ovando, who denounced General Vasquez, stated that the army would prevent anarchy, and hinted that the armed forces would take a more active role in the government.

The government seems to have this threat under control but is still faced with a rising tide of student violence that has recently received encouragement and support from some labor and political groups. In a clash with La Paz police on 20 August, students extensively damaged the Bolivian-American binational center. 25X1

Adding fuel to the student disorders and general public unrest has been the return to Bolivia of Antonio Arguedas, the former minister of government, who has admitted giving the Guevara diary to the Cubans. His anti-American statements and charges of US involvement in Bolivian affairs have found an attentive audience in Bolivia. It is likely that he will furnish the opposition with popular nationalistic issues to rally sentiment against the government when he goes on trial for treason. 25X1

This continuing unrest and the prospect of further public disorders will probably encourage the army to take a stronger role in the government and could lead to circumstances in which General Ovando would feel that he had sufficient support among the military and the public to take over the government himself, a move which many observers have predicted would eventually come. 25X1

His announcement over La Paz radio on 20 August that he was in open revolt against the Barrientos government was apparently intended as a belated signal for his followers to make their move. When they tried to take a military arsenal, however, arrests were made and the main thrust of the dissidents was stopped. 25X1

The public call to revolt by General Vasquez was answered by armed forces commander General

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HAITI EXPLOITING TRIALS FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES

President Duvalier is exploiting the trials of persons allegedly involved in the invasion on 20 May for propaganda attacks against "enemies" abroad, including the US.

Last week Duvalier commuted death sentences imposed on ten Haitian defendants to imprisonment for an indefinite period on grounds that they were duped by "professional instigators of international piracy." During the trial, his government had attempted to establish a link between persons in Haiti and the Haitian Coalition, an exile organization based in New York and the Bahamas. Haiti continues to charge that the invasion could

not have been staged without US and British complicity.

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The current trial of David Knox is also providing a wealth of propaganda. Knox, a British government official in the Bahamas, was arrested on 1 June shortly after he arrived in Haiti. He is accused of espionage activities related to the invasion. Duvalier has long been irritated by the failure of foreign governments to monitor the activities of Haitian exiles. Although the charges against Knox have not been substantiated, the Haitian Government is attempting to portray Haiti as the innocent victim of an international racist conspiracy. [REDACTED]

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